{"id":6506,"date":"2026-10-28T23:14:39","date_gmt":"2026-10-28T20:14:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/?page_id=6506"},"modified":"2026-10-28T23:27:38","modified_gmt":"2026-10-28T20:27:38","slug":"en-18246-dpp-veri-imza-butunluk-degisiklik-izi","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/uyum-denetim-due-diligence-danismanligi\/dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp\/en-18246-dpp-veri-imza-butunluk-degisiklik-izi\/","title":{"rendered":"Trusting DPP Data: Signature, Integrity, and Change Trace with EN 18246"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Every piece of information entered into a digital product passport (DPP) can one day be read by a buyer, customs officer, or market surveillance authority. The question at that moment will be simple: Who put this data in, and has it changed since then? This article in the DPP Standards Guide series describes how EN 18246:2026 answers this question: digital certificates, signatures, change trails, and privacy in public passports. Finally, we briefly touch upon its relationship with EN 18235-1:2026, which is often cited alongside it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"aes-standart-durumu\" style=\"border-left:4px solid #1F4E79;background:#f3f6fa;padding:14px 18px;margin:18px 0 22px 0;font-size:15px;line-height:1.6;color:#222;\"><strong>Official status of the standard<\/strong><ul style=\"margin:8px 0 6px 18px;padding:0;\"><li>EN 18246:2026 (data authentication, reliability and integrity) was published in September 2026. As of the end of October 2026, there is no reference to it in the Official Journal of the EU; therefore, it does not yet provide a presumption of conformity.<\/li><li>EN 18235-1:2026 (reliable data handling, terms and concepts) was published in March 2026; it is not specific to DPP.<\/li><\/ul><span style=\"font-size:13px;color:#555;\">Source: CEN\/CENELEC publication information and the Official Journal of the European Union (EUR-Lex), checked 28 October 2026.<\/span><\/div>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"aes-ortak-notu\" style=\"border-left:4px solid #CE1A1A;background:#f6f6f6;padding:14px 18px;margin:18px 0 22px 0;font-size:15px;line-height:1.6;color:#222;\"><strong>Service note:<\/strong> AES Innovation carries out the EU compliance work described on this page (PPWR, digital product passport, CBAM, etc.) in collaboration with expert solution partners; it does not provide these services directly. These activities are outside the scope of our accreditation (AB-0631-M).<\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">What does the standard regulate, and what does it not regulate?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">EN 18246 sets out information processing and communication requirements to maintain integrity (data unaltered), authenticity (data originating from the claimed source), and reliability in DPP data exchange. Reducing product counterfeiting through verification mechanisms is also among its objectives (EN 18246, clause 1). It emphasizes electronically signed data constructs (ESDCs) as carriers of trust in multi-actor value chains (clause 1 and Annex A.2).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The following are explicitly excluded: DPP system architecture, DPP use cases, secure elements in data carriers, and cryptographic security features of unique product identifiers (clause 1). What data is included in the passport is also a matter for product group-specific regulations, not this standard (clause 0.1); for sectoral data... <a href=\"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/uyum-denetim-due-diligence-danismanligi\/dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp\/tekstil-sektorunde-dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp-espr-veri-gereklilikleri-ve-hazirlik\/\">textile<\/a> And <a href=\"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/uyum-denetim-due-diligence-danismanligi\/dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp\/celik-sektorunde-dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp-espr-kapsaminda-karbon-geri-donusum-ve-izlenebilirlik-verisi\/\">steel<\/a> You can check out our articles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Remembering the division of labor makes it easier: <a href=\"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/uyum-denetim-due-diligence-danismanligi\/dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp\/en-18239-dpp-erisim-haklari-ticari-gizlilik\/\">In our EN 18239 document<\/a> The standard we are considering answers the question of &quot;who has access to what,&quot; while EN 18246 answers the question of &quot;where did the data come from and has it changed?&quot;.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Signature, certificate, and change trace: what the standard requires.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These concepts are often confused; the table summarizes the function of each.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table><thead><tr><th>Concept<\/th><th>What is it used for?<\/th><th>Its place in the standard<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>Digital certificate<\/td><td>It links an organization&#039;s or individual&#039;s public key to their identity; it is signed by the certificate authority.<\/td><td>Articles 3.6, 4.7, Annex B.6.2<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Digital signature<\/td><td>It allows the recipient to verify the source of a specific data point and ensure it has not changed.<\/td><td>Articles 3.8, 4.7, Annex B.6<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Change log<\/td><td>It records every creation, modification, and deletion in a way that the creator cannot later retract.<\/td><td>Article 4.7, 5.3.2<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Electronic Signature Data Structure (ESDC)<\/td><td>A signed data packet consisting of a header, payload, signature, and optional fields, which is detectable when tampered with.<\/td><td>Article 3.1, Appendix A<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Verification should be independent of the communication channel.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The fundamental rule of the standard is this: whether publicly accessible or controlled, all data in DPP must be protected against unauthorized modification and its source must be verifiable. The mechanism guaranteeing integrity and authenticity must be separate from the security measures of the communication channel through which the data is transmitted (clause 4.1). Our conclusion: it is not enough for your site to simply use HTTPS; the data itself must be verifiable, for example, with a signature. The prerequisite for this is the product. <a href=\"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/uyum-denetim-due-diligence-danismanligi\/dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp\/en-18219-dpp-benzersiz-tanimlayici-urun-operator-tesis-kimligi\/\">unique product identifier<\/a> It must have (Article 4.1, Note 1).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Everyone who writes data is certified, every change is linked to an identity.<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The identity of every actor providing data to DPP must be verified. To this end, the actor must prove ownership of a digital certificate issued to them at the end of an identity proofing process (clause 4.7). This process is required to be \u201ccompliant with relevant legal regulations\u201d; the standard is not clear on what level of regulation and assurance is meant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Every change, including the initial creation and deletion of data, must be attributed to the authenticated actor who made the change. The aim is to prevent subsequent rebuttal of that change (clause 4.7). The standard cites digital signatures, digital seals, electronic attribution assurance (EAA), and ESDCs based on digital certificates as examples of such technologies (clause 4.7). According to Informative Annex B.6, the fundamental difference between a signature and a seal is that a signature belongs to a natural person, while a seal belongs to a legal entity. No single format is imposed; the choice may depend on the use case, carrier constraints, existing infrastructure, and regulation (Annex A.3). Visible digital seals (ISO 22376), ISO\/IEC 20248, and W3C verifiable declarations are informative examples (Annex B).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Trace of alteration<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Every creation, modification, and deletion of data must be recorded in a way that the perpetrator cannot deny; the integrity of the record must be preserved over time, and the person responsible for the change must be identifiable by a globally unique operator identifier (clause 4.7). The standard states that the record must be tamper-proof, but this is not a requirement; the text is not entirely clear on this point. Retrospective tampering must also be prevented: this can be achieved by addressing changes to regulatory-significant content. <a href=\"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/uyum-denetim-due-diligence-danismanligi\/dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp\/en-18221-dpp-veri-saklama-arsiv-yedek-kalicilik\/\">EN 18221<\/a> The appropriate recording is required (clause 5.3.2). The standard does not define its own versioning scheme.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">What does a signature prove, and what does it not prove?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The functions that the standard imposes on signed data structures are: to verify that the data has not changed after signing, to indicate the source of the data through the issuer&#039;s identity, to ensure that the issuer cannot be refuted, and to verify the issuer&#039;s authority and accreditation by checking their certificate against a trusted list or governance framework (Annex A.3). &quot;Content is correct&quot; is not included in this list.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What follows is not a statement of the standard, but an inference we made from the function list in Appendix A.3. In practice, the signature tells the reader, &quot;This data was entered by this organization and has not changed since&quot;; it does not say that the measurement is accurate. If you sign an incorrect carbon value, you will have incorrect data that has been correctly signed, and due to non-repudiation, that record will remain in your name.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Two rules stand out on the verification side. Checking the validity and integrity of DPP data must be free and unrestricted for the validator; the user is not obliged to perform verification (clause 4.7). The validator is any party performing the verification (clause 3.13); informative Annex B.5 gives the receiving application, customer, customs and other third parties as examples. Therefore, you cannot link verification to a paid service (clause 4.7).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Regarding third-party verification, EN 18246 does not contain a provision requiring the content of the data to be certified by an independent organization. The standard only states that other authorized actors may provide their own certifications or updates as a signed data structure (Annex A.3). Whether independent verification is required for a specific data is not determined by this standard; it is necessary to refer to the relevant product group regulation. A separate level is not defined for &quot;reliability&quot; in the title; there is only a reference to the level of assurance of authentication (clauses 3.5, 4.2).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Transferring the data from the supplier to the passport.<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A significant portion of the material or carbon data in the passport typically comes from the supplier. Since the rules apply to all DPP data (clauses 4.1 and 4.7), this data is also covered by the identification and change trail. The standard does not use the word \u201csupplier\u201d at all and does not prescribe a model for this data; the following three pathways are options we have derived from the standard\u2019s provisions:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The supplier writes the data directly to the passport: In this case, it is also the data provider; it must verify its identity by proving certificate ownership, the changes it makes must be linked to its own identity, and it must be identifiable with a globally unique operator identifier (clause 4.7). If it accesses controlled data, it must be identifiable (clauses 4.2, 5.2.2).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The supplier provides its own signed declaration: The issuer of the basic product data is usually the economic operator placing the product on the market, but other authorized actors may issue specific approvals as a signed data structure, and these structures may be part of a broader collection of declarations (Annex A.3). The standard lists material composition and certificates of conformity as examples of data that may be included in such a structure (Annex A.3).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>You re-enter the data: the signature is yours and tells the reader that you have entered the data. The signed form of the passport already includes the signature of the responsible economic operator or authorized representative (Annex A.3).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The standard does not specifically require you to retain the supplier&#039;s original document; a common practice is to keep the supplier&#039;s signed declaration or test report as a source record. Although Annex A is marked normative, it is not clear in the text whether ESDC is a mandatory structure or one of the technologies in clause 4.7.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Public passport: privacy and accessibility<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Security measures should not prevent the passport from being easily read by everyone. The standard rules are:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Authentication cannot be required to read publicly available data (clause 4.3).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Personal information should not be collected from individuals who only read public data (Article 5.1.2). When providing public data, the system should not request personal data from the user&#039;s device; nor should it access device functions such as location, notifications, SMS, or application installation (Article 5.1.6).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>External analytical tools should not be used in the DPP service, and the response sent to the user should not contain links to external components (clause 5.1.3). Profiling by combining IP addresses, HTTP data, and user behavior should be prevented in advance as far as technically possible (clause 5.1.5).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Public data should be accessible without requiring additional software; QR readers in browsers and cameras do not constitute additional software (clauses 3.10, 4.3). At least one data carrier in each product must provide this access (clause 4.5), and additional security measures should not prevent it (clauses 4.3, 4.6). Details regarding carriers. <a href=\"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/uyum-denetim-due-diligence-danismanligi\/dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp\/en-18220-iso-iec-18004-dpp-qr-kod-veri-tasiyici-secimi-baski-kalitesi\/\">in our data carrier article<\/a>.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Every individual should be able to access their passport at any time using an internet-connected device such as a smartphone, tablet, or computer (clause 5.4.2). Persons with disabilities should be able to perceive, understand, and navigate public content; accessibility measures should not compromise security, and alternative access methods should protect the integrity and authenticity of the data (clause 5.4.3).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>As long as legal requirements are met, authentication and identification cannot be restricted based on the location of the individual or organization (clause 5.2.2).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Our assessment: The habit of marketing teams adding tracking codes to web pages is inconsistent with these points on the publicly accessible DPP page.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Relationship with EN 18235-1<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">EN 18235-1, published in March 2026, is not specific to DPP; it is a standard of terms and concepts for \u2019reliable data processing\u201c. Its scope is limited to the description of terms, concepts, and mechanisms, and it contains no requirements; nor is it referenced (EN 18235-1, clauses 1 and 2). It should not be presented as a referenced standard under ESPR. It was prepared by a different technical committee (CEN\/CLC JTC 25) than CEN-CENELEC\/JTC 24, which prepares the DPP standards; EN 18246 does not refer to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nevertheless, it offers a common language when discussing supplier data. The standard&#039;s concept of &quot;data product&quot; describes the package of data shared, including its metadata and, if applicable, license terms; this does not have to be a commercial product (clause 3.5). The concepts of data license terms (clause 3.4) and data sharing agreement (clause 3.12) help regulate the question of &quot;who can use this carbon data, under what conditions, and for how long.&quot; According to the standard, a data processing operation does not have to involve a commercial relationship or fee; the data can remain with the provider and only access can be granted to the user. The agreement is described as an electronically linked, verifiable, tamper-evident document that can be read by both humans and machines (clause 4.3.2).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Our interpretation: The concepts of trust service and trust anchor in 18235-1 (clauses 3.13, 3.14) overlap with the concepts of trusted list and trust service provider in EN 18246 (EN 18246, Annex A.3, Annex B.2 and Annex B.6.2). However, there is no contract or negotiation at the public level of the passport; the contract-centric model of 18235-1 is more suited to data shared with business partners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Decisions you need to make as a producer<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Which signature technology: electronic seal on behalf of the institution, digital signature, EAA, W3C verifiable declaration, ISO\/IEC 20248 or visible digital seal (clause 4.7, Annex A, Annex B).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Which provider you will obtain the digital certificate from and what identity verification process you will use (clause 4.7). The standard does not mention eIDAS by name; the equivalent of qualified electronic certificates issued in T\u00fcrkiye in the EU is also not the subject of the standard and should be investigated separately.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Who can write data on the passport; each writer requires a certificate and a globally unique identifier (clauses 4.2, 4.7).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Where the change authorization and the record in accordance with EN 18221 will be kept, and whether your DPP service provider meets this requirement (clauses 4.7, 5.3.2). It is recommended that the ETSI EN 319 401:2024 requirements for trust service providers be applied to DPP service providers (clause 4.4).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Whether you will assess the risk of fraud (the standard recommends this where relevant) and, if the risk is high, whether you will take proportionate measures; for example, protecting the data carrier with visible markings that the consumer can also verify or with a verification service linked to the DPP (clauses 4.5, 4.6, 5.3.1).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">First steps for preparation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>For each data field that will be included in the passport, create a table answering the question &quot;who is the source, who will sign?&quot;.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Ask your key suppliers if they have certified electronic signatures or seals and if they can provide signed declarations.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Explore provider options for electronic seals on behalf of your organization and the recognition of these certificates within the EU.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Ask prospective DPP service providers in writing what they offer in terms of data-level signatures, free verification, and change tracking.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Review the publicly available passport page template in terms of tracking code, external components, login screen, and device permissions; try it with a screen reader.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Establish written terms of use with your data provider partners; you can use EN 18235-1 terminology as a common language.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Information Note<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This content is for informational purposes only and does not replace the standard text; in practice, the current and complete text of the standard should be used. AES is not an approved or certification body; it does not issue, verify, or certify Digital Product Passport documents, and does not offer any passport software or Registration System services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">AES&#039;s T\u00dcRKAK accreditation covers only the periodic inspection of electrical installations (AB-0631-M). The above information does not constitute a binding legal or technical opinion; each specific case should be evaluated within its own context.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Related Services and Content<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/uyum-denetim-due-diligence-danismanligi\/dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp\/en-18219-dpp-benzersiz-tanimlayici-urun-operator-tesis-kimligi\/\">Unique Identifier in DPP: Product, Operator and Facility according to EN 18219<\/a><\/li>\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/uyum-denetim-due-diligence-danismanligi\/dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp\/en-18220-iso-iec-18004-dpp-qr-kod-veri-tasiyici-secimi-baski-kalitesi\/\">QR Code and Data Carrier for DPP: EN 18220 and ISO\/IEC 18004 Guidelines<\/a><\/li>\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/uyum-denetim-due-diligence-danismanligi\/dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp\/en-18239-dpp-erisim-haklari-ticari-gizlilik\/\">Who Sees What in DPP? Access Rights and Commercial Privacy with EN 18239<\/a><\/li>\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/uyum-denetim-due-diligence-danismanligi\/dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp\/en-18221-dpp-veri-saklama-arsiv-yedek-kalicilik\/\">Where and for how long is DPP data stored? Archiving and backup according to EN 18221.<\/a><\/li>\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/uyum-denetim-due-diligence-danismanligi\/dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp\/dpp-yazilimi-secimi-en-18216-en-18222-en-18223-protokol-api\/\">When Choosing DPP Software: Protocol and API according to EN 18216, 18222 and 18223.<\/a><\/li>\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/uyum-denetim-due-diligence-danismanligi\/dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp\/dpp-hazirlik-kontrol-listesi-en-standartlarina-gore-uretici-kararlari\/\">DPP Preparation Checklist: Manufacturer Decisions According to Eight EN Standards<\/a><\/li>\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/uyum-denetim-due-diligence-danismanligi\/dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp\/dijital-urun-pasaportu-teknik-altyapisi-en-standartlari-veri-tasiyici-ve-ab-kayit-sistemi\/\">Digital Product Passport Technical Infrastructure: EN Standards, Data Carrier and EU Registration System<\/a><\/li>\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/espr-ve-dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp-ihracatci-ureticiler-icin-kapsamli-rehber\/\">ESPR and Digital Product Passport (DPP): A Comprehensive Guide for Exporting Manufacturers<\/a><\/li>\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/uyum-denetim-due-diligence-danismanligi\/dijital-urun-pasaportu-dpp\/\">Digital Product Passport (DPP) Services<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Frequently Asked Questions<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">How can I prove that the information in my passport is mine and hasn&#039;t been altered?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Marking data with a signature or seal based on a digital certificate issued to you is a common practice; the standard requires that every creation, modification, and deletion be linked to your identity and lists examples of such technologies (EN 18246, clause 4.7). This authentication mechanism must be separate from the security of the communication channel; therefore, HTTPS alone is insufficient (clause 4.1). Changes must also be recorded in an irrefutable manner (clause 4.7).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Does a digital signature prove the accuracy of the data?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">No. The signature indicates the source of the data and that it has not been altered since signing (clause 3.8). The functions listed by the standard for signed data structures are integrity, source, non-repudiation, and verification of the issuer&#039;s authority; accuracy of the content is not among these functions (Annex A.3). Our assessment of the accuracy of the measurement or statement is a matter for your processes and the relevant regulation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">How do I flag carbon or material data from my supplier?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If the supplier writes the data directly into the passport, they must also verify their identity by proving certificate ownership; any changes they make are also linked to their identity (clause 4.7). Other authorized actors may also provide their declarations as a signed data structure (Annex A.3). If you re-enter the data, the signature becomes yours and tells the reader that you entered the data.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Is third-party verification mandatory?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">EN 18246 does not contain a provision requiring the content of the data to be certified by an independent organization. What it requires regarding verification is that any verifier should be able to freely and unrestrictedly check the validity and integrity of the DPP data (clauses 3.13, 4.7). Check the product group regulation to determine if independent verification is required for a specific data set.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Can I use the analytics tool or login screen on my publicly accessible DPP page?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The answer is no for the login screen and external analytics tool. Access to public data cannot be linked to authentication (clause 4.3), and externally provided analytics tools should not be used in the DPP service (clause 5.1.3). The standard does not address metrics within your own infrastructure; however, personal information should not be collected from the person reading the public data (clause 5.1.2), and user profiling should be prevented (clause 5.1.5).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">If I apply EN 18246, will I gain a presumption of conformity with ESPR?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Not yet. The standard was published in September 2026; as of the end of October 2026, it is not referenced in the Official Journal of the EU, therefore the presumption of conformity has not yet arisen. Furthermore, the current Annex ZA table only links the actors clause (clause 4.2) to ESPR Article 11(a); the signature and trace of amendment clauses are not included in this table (Annex ZA, Table ZA.1).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Do I need to comply with EN 18235-1?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">No. EN 18235-1 is a standard of terms and concepts that does not contain requirements, and it has no normative reference (EN 18235-1, clauses 1 and 2). It is not specific to DPP; it is useful as a common language when discussing data sharing terms with suppliers.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>EN 18246:2026 requires that all data in the DPP (Digital Product Protection Unit) be verifiable in terms of its origin and that it has not been altered. We explain what the signature, certificate, and modification authorization impose on the manufacturer and its relationship to EN 18235-1.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":6505,"parent":4959,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_kad_blocks_custom_css":"","_kad_blocks_head_custom_js":"","_kad_blocks_body_custom_js":"","_kad_blocks_footer_custom_js":"","_kadence_starter_templates_imported_post":false,"_kad_post_transparent":"","_kad_post_title":"","_kad_post_layout":"","_kad_post_sidebar_id":"","_kad_post_content_style":"","_kad_post_vertical_padding":"","_kad_post_feature":"","_kad_post_feature_position":"","_kad_post_header":false,"_kad_post_footer":false,"_kad_post_classname":"","slim_seo":{"title":"EN 18246: Signature, Integrity and Change Trace in DPP Data","description":"How does EN 18246 verify the source and integrity of DPP data? Through digital certificates, signatures, change trails, supplier data, and publicly available passports."},"_pplb_hide_from_list":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-6506","page","type-page","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry"],"acf":[],"taxonomy_info":[],"featured_image_src_large":["https:\/\/aesinn.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/dpp-en18246-aes-kart-1024x1024.png",1024,1024,true],"author_info":{"display_name":"Emre Metin","author_link":"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/author\/yonetim\/"},"comment_info":"","_hostinger_reach_plugin_has_subscription_block":false,"_hostinger_reach_plugin_is_elementor":false,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/6506","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6506"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/6506\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6519,"href":"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/6506\/revisions\/6519"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4959"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6505"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/aesinn.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6506"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}